Compared to foreign grants, do concessional loans from foreign governments and/or unsubsidized loans from foreign private banks lead to faster growth in developing nations? The answer has implications for aid agencies (i) in allocating a given amount of resources between grants and concessional loans; and (ii) in encouraging financial market reforms. We examine the effects of ODA grants, concessional ODA loans, and private offshore bank loans on growth rates of 131 developing nations over 1996-2010 in a unified way. We find evidence of non-linearities in all three relationships, suggesting that at low (high) levels grants are better (worse) than loans (concessional or private).
Introduction
The literature has explored effects of foreign aid on growth. Another strand of the literature has explored effects of credits on growth. In the context of developing nations needing scarce external resources, this poses the following question. Compared to foreign aid, do external loans lead to faster growth in developing nations? This is the central question of our study. The answer has implications for aid agencies (i) in deciding on the allocation of a given amount of aid dollars between grants and concessional loans; and (ii) in encouraging financial market reforms for the inflow of private foreign capital. Our central question also relates to the strand of literature which is critical of foreign aid and suggests that it should be replaced by better access to international credit (see, for example, Bauer, 1971) .
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid can be broadly classified into three types: foreign aid works (see for example Dalgaard et al., 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2000) ; foreign aid does not work (see, for example, Easterly, 2003) ; and foreign aid works under some conditions (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002) . Foreign aid can help foster the economic growth of a developing country through various channels: (i) they add to the investible resources for domestic investment, and, thus, augment capital stock; and (ii) they can bridge the foreign exchange gap of a developing country, which, in turn, may provide it with a necessary cushion to import capital goods.
1 On the other hand, aid flows can also have effects that are detrimental to the recipient's economy: (i) transfers to the governments may induce politicians to engage in its misappropriation; and (ii) large inflows can result in overvaluation of exchange rate of a recipient country, which may render its exports less competitive in the world market. Since most of foreign aid constitutes direct transfers to governments, its impact on economic growth also depends on how it is utilized. If aid is used to finance complementary goods in developing countries, such as infrastructure and human development, its effect will be positive. But if it crowds out private investment or is used to generate rent seeking activities by politicians, its effect will be negative. As indicated by Harms and Lutz (2006) , the net effect of aid on the economy, therefore, will depend on which effect dominates. Recent studies continue to provide mixed guidance. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) do not find any robust relationship between aid inflows and economic growth. Djankov et al. (2008) find that aid may actually worsen the democratic institutions of a nation.
Although they do not focus on the effect of aid on growth per se, a worsening of political institutions will likely contribute to greater rent seeking and wastage, and consequently reduced effectiveness of aid. On the other hand, a recent study by Arndt et al. (2010) concludes that aid has significant and positive effects in the long-run. The study warns against the mistake of abolishing foreign aid, and suggests a more nuanced view which focuses on improved aid effectiveness.
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On the relationship between international credit and growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998) ask a slightly different but related question: do industries that are relatively more dependent on external finance grow more rapidly in nations with more developed financial markets? Their empirical analysis suggests that this is indeed the case. 3 This suggests a causal link between external finance and growth, where reductions of cost of external finance may allow a financially dependent firm to grow, or new firms to enter.
As indicated by Arndt et al. (2010) , it is important to allow for non-linearities in the aidgrowth relationship. Levine (2005) discusses its importance in the context of the finance-growth 2 There is a large literature on different motives for giving aid (see, for example, Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . 3 There is a separate, but not directly related to the present context, link between financial development in general and growth. For example, King and Levine (1993) investigate this for a cross-section of nations using a variety of indicators for financial development, including the ratio of assets of "deposit money banks" and the sum of assets of the "deposit money banks" and the respective central banks of different nations in the cross-country analysis. They conclude that "The data are consistent with the view that financial services stimulate economic growth by increasing the rate of capital accumulation and by improving the efficiency with which economies use that capital." Levine (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of this strand of the literature. He concludes that the overall evidence from research on the topic suggests that both financial intermediaries (e.g., banks) and financial markets (e.g., stock markets) are important for growth.
literature. The lack of consensus about the nature of these relationships may have something to do with the absence of a thorough treatment of non-linearities in this literature. The inflow of foreign aid in some countries now constitute 20% or more of their national income and there have been concerns because of the possible adverse effect of large inflow of foreign aid via their effects on, among others, the exchange rate (see, for example, Mavrotas (2006) for a discussion of the issues).
In fact, Hansen and Tarp (2001) do find diminishing returns to aid in promoting growth.
There are theoretical reasons why the relationship between credit and growth can also be non-linear. For example, existence of indivisibilities in investments, such as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) , may give rise to convexities. In early stages of development, risk diversification possibilities are limited, and this leads to investment in less productive but safer projects. As the process of development matures, more of the start-up hurdles are crossed, risk diversification opportunities improve, and consequently more productive investment occurs. This leads to a nonlinear relationship between capital accumulation and growth. Among others, Rioja and Valev (2004) have explored the non-linear relationship between finance and growth. They divide their sample of nations into three groups, low, intermediate and high levels of financial development. They find the strongest positive effects of financial development on growth in the intermediate region, supporting the idea of a convex relationship, at least towards the lower end of the spectrum of financial development.
In this paper, we bring together the two literatures by exploring both the aid-growth and the aid-loans relationships in a single framework. We consider total aid as well as its separate grant and concessional loan components. We also consider loans to the private sector by foreign banks. We also allow for non-linearities in the relationships of these variables with growth. Our panel-data framework draws on 131 aid-recipient countries for the period 1996-2010. Data on foreign aid is collected from the OECD, and to measure a developing nation's access to foreign borrowing in the private market, we take offshore bank loans data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
Locational Banking Statistics. Our empirical procedure attempts to address a host of estimation issues such as measurement problems, reverse causality, and omitted variables bias -ignoring these would risk estimation bias and inconsistency. We employ alternative econometric techniques and model specifications to ensure that our results are robust. We also examine whether the presence of sample heterogeneity affects our findings, because countries at different levels of income may experience distinct outcomes.
We find interesting patterns of non-linearities. The relationship between grants and growth is an inverted-U one, confirming the diminishing returns findings of Hansen and Tarp (2001) , among others. We also find, along the lines of the finance-growth literature, that the loans-growth relationship is U-shaped. The latter is true for concessional loan by aid agencies and credit by foreign banks. Interestingly, we find that the nature of non-linear relationships between the two components of foreign aid, namely grants and concessional loans, are very different, highlighting the importance of separating the two. Taking cue from these non-linearities, we compute critical levels of international transfers such that the marginal effect of grants is larger than that of loans if and only if the transfer (grant, concessional loan or private bank loan) is below the relevant critical level.
This suggests that when an aid agency finds itself with a very small amount of resources to allocate, it may choose grants over loans. Otherwise, loans may be the preferred tool.
Section 2 lays out the empirical model and describes the variables and data. Section 3 discusses econometric methodology. Section 4 presents estimation results and robustness analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Model and the Description of Variables
Following the empirical literature on aid and growth, we use the growth rate of real GDP per capita (e.g., Arndt et al., 2010; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001) 
where i refers to countries, t to time, κ t indicates year-specific effects, η i reflects country-specific effects, and µ it is the error term. Z is the vector of commonly used control variables in the literature, which are detailed below. While the time effects account for the impact of time varying common shocks to the economy, the country-specific fixed-effects control for the influence of unobservable factors that may affect the economy. Inclusion of the fixed-effects not only accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, but also reduces biases related to the omission of relevant variables. The quarterly loans data for exchange rate changes are fine-tuned by BIS. BIS also converts the relevant flow of new loans (net of repayments) in each quarter of the year into its original currency using end-of-period exchange rates, and eventually converts the changes in stocks into dollar amounts using period-average exchange rates. Quarterly observations can be converted to annual observations by just adding up data for the four quarters. The data for loans are corrected 5 There are a few other data sources for credits in the literature. The Financial Structure Database provides the countrylevel measures of credit constraints which is compiled by Beck et al., (2000) and updated by Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) . Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide the sector level variables such as external finance dependence and asset tangibility, and these have been updated in Chor and Manova (2012) . The third is the BIS data (see, for example, Papaioannou (2009) and Hermann and Mihaljek (2011) ). The first two sources present us with knowledge on the extent of credit constraints and the third source gives us data on the flow of foreign loans. Since the rationale of this paper is to compare the flow of net foreign aid with that of net foreign loans received by a country, we concentrate on the third source. 6 Detailed information on the locational banking statistics is available on the BIS website under http://www.bis.org/statistics/.
for the size of the loans recipient country (as in the foreign aid case) as percentage of the GDP of the loans receiving country.
While all of our main econometric specifications include both time-specific and countryspecific fixed effects, we take guidelines from the recent aid-growth literature for the selection of time-variant control variables (e.g., Arndt et al., 2010; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001 ). Specifically, we include: investment/GDP as commonly proxied by fixed capital formation, government consumption/GDP, initial real GDP per capita, inflation as measured by GDP deflator, trade openness as measured by export plus imports/GDP and the variable of voice & accountability to capture formal institutions' effectiveness. 7 We employ alternative measures of institutional quality to check robustness of our main results. Data for the indicators of institutional quality, i.e., voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption, are taken from Kaufmann et al. (2010; updated 2012 ).
In our sample, the values of these indices range from -2.986 to +1.645, where a higher score
indicates better institutional quality. Data for growth rate of real GDP per capita, initial real GDP per capita, inflation and trade openness are taken from WDI (2012), while data for investment/GDP and government consumption/GDP come from the Penn World Table, compiled by Heston et al., (2011) .
We take log transformation of all of main variables of interests because these variables, i.e., foreign aid, ODA grants, ODA loans, offshore bank loans and growth rate of real GDP per capita, exhibit skewed distribution. Their log transformation helps smooth the data and reduces the effect of outliers on estimates. Taking the log of these variables overcomes the measurement problem 7 Another valid control variable for inclusion in a growth regression is a factor that may capture the level of human capital stock in a country such as secondary school attainment. Since there are plenty of missing observations in the per annum data for this variable, we do not explicitly include this variable in the regressions as its inclusion results in a substantial reduction in number of observations. However, to check whether our results remain robust with its inclusion, we interpolated missing observations by calculating averages from available values. The findings remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
involved with the scaling of different variables. Another important advantage is that, with log transformation, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 .
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[ Table 1near here]
The Empirical Methodology
The issue of establishing causation is a challenge in any growth equation. We take several measures to ensure that our findings are not spurious: First, we report results of our baseline regressions and then sequentially add a myriad of control variables along with time and country-specific fixed effects.
Second, we apply alternative econometric techniques on the data − the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), the first-differenced regressions, and the dynamic difference-generalized method of moments (DGMM) estimator. Finally, we divide our sample countries into different income groups and then conduct our analysis.
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation may also bias the estimates. Therefore, we run a series of FGLS regressions where we explicitly allow for the presence of heteroscedasticity across panels and serial correlation within a panel, which gives panel-corrected robust standard errors.
Another concern is that it is indeed likely and quite plausible that both foreign aid and foreign loans may be influenced by economic growth in a country, raising concerns about their simultaneous causation in equation (1). A conventional solution to deal with this issue is to use the instrumental variable (IV) approach. This, however, requires the validity of the utilized instruments (and the availability of their data) for potentially endogenous variables such as aid, ODA grants, ODA loans, 8 Data on some observations for some variables, i.e., foreign aid, foreign loans, growth rate of GDP per capita and inflation, exhibit negative values. Following others in the literature, we linearly transform the variables with negative observations by adding a constant of one in their respective minimum values in the sample so that after taking log their lowest value equals zero. This ensures that log transformation does not drop observations with negative values. Note that several past empirical studies on aid have used log-log transformation for deriving estimation result (e.g., Dollar and Levin, 2004; Younas, 2008 
We acknowledge that the lagging of our variables of interest may not completely resolve the concern about reverse causation in equation (2). Thus, we also check robustness of results by employing the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique, which has also been applied by several recent contributions in the aid-growth literature (e.g., Arndt et al., 2010; Hansen and Tarp, 2001) . Although some studies have pointed out that GMM should not be taken as a panacea for all estimation issues, it has been used extensively in the recent literature. 9 For example, Baltagi et al.,
preferred using the difference-GMM (DGMM) for their panel-data analysis of the impact of openness on financial development. They argued that this estimator not only eliminates endogeneity to a great extent, but first differencing of data also ensures that all regressors are stationary (p. 287).
We also employ the dynamic DGMM estimator, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) .
To tackle the issue of endogeneity, DGMM takes the first difference of the data and then employs lagged values of endogenous variables as their instruments. The literature, however, has pointed out two issues that should to be taken into account when applying this estimator: First, estimates are inconsistent in the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. For this reason, we employ two specification tests for each regression: (i) second-order serial correlation test to validate the absence of autocorrelation, and (ii) the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to confirm the validity of our internal instruments. 10 If the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, this bolsters support for the model, which is the case in all of our regressions. Second, these tests may lose power when the countries-to-instruments ratio, r = n/i, is less than one, where n is the number of countries and i is the number of instruments (e.g., Asiedu and Lien 2011, Roodman, 2009) . Note that in almost all of our regressions r >1. Furthermore, we use two-step GMM estimation technique in all regressions, which is considered asymptotically efficient and robust to all types of heteroskedasticity (e.g., Asiedu
and Lien, 2011). First differencing of the DGMM model eliminates the time invariant countryspecific fixed-effects, and thus the relationship that we estimate will take the following form: 
n .
10 We treat all explanatory variables as endogenous and only utilize their internal instruments generated in the model.
Estimation Results

Baseline regressions
In Table 2 , we report results of our baseline regressions by applying FGLS estimation technique, where we only include our primary variables of interest. In columns (1-4), we first estimate the model by imposing the restriction that both time and country-specific fixed-effects, which account for other influences of growth and omitted factors bias, do not matter (i.e., τ t = 0∀t, and η i = 0∀i).
Column (1) regresses log growth rate of real GDP per capita on log aid/GDP, log offshore bank loans/GDP and their squared terms. Columns (2) and (3) subdivide aid into ODA grants and ODA loans, respectively. Column (4) includes all of our main variables of interest, i.e., log ODA grants/GDP, log ODA loans/GDP, log offshore loans/GDP and their squared terms. Columns (5-8) repeat this exercise by also including both time and country-specific fixed-effects in each specification. In Table 3 , we take first-difference of the data and report estimation results. Note that first differencing eliminates the country-specific fixed effects. The results show that the coefficients of log offshore bank loans/GDP and its squared term are statistically significant in all the regressions and their signs are as expected. However, the coefficients of log aid/GDP and its subdivided components (i.e., log ODA grants/GDP, log ODA loans/GDP and their squared terms)
are mainly statistically significant in the regressions that include both time and country-specific fixed-effects (columns 5-8 in Table 2 and columns 1-4 in Table 3 ). Their signs also agree with the concavity of the aid-growth and the convexity of the finance-growth relationship one may expect based on the existing literature. In contrast to the diminishing marginal effect of aid and of ODA grants on growth, both ODA loans and offshore bank loans have an increasing marginal effect on growth. These baseline regression results suggest that models that account for unobserved country level heterogeneity and common time shocks to the economy perform better. In the following section, we check for robustness of our results by sequentially including a number of control variables and applying alternative econometric techniques to the data.
[ Tables 2 & 3 near here]
Fully specified model
In Table 4 , we report results for our fully specified models by including a full set of control variables as mentioned above. All of these regressions include both time and country-specific fixed-effects.
Columns (1) through (4) present results of FGLS regressions. In column (1), the positively significant coefficient of log aid/GDP and negatively significant coefficient of its squared term confirm its diminishing marginal impact on growth. This finding implies that while some countries may utilize aid effectively, others lack the absorptive capacity or institutional quality with which to complement aid. 11 As also pointed out by Harms and Lutz (2006) , this also indicates that, after reaching a threshold level, the negative rent seeking effect of aid dominates its positive infrastructure building effect. On the other hand, the negatively significant coefficient of log offshore bank loans/GDP and positively significant coefficient of its squared term point to its increasing marginal return on growth, as may be anticipated in the light of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) .
Next, we split the aid variable into ODA grants and ODA loans to determine whether the diminishing marginal effect of aid is being reflected from its grants or its loans component, or from both. Accordingly, our revised estimating equation takes the form: 
First, we include these two components of aid separately (columns 2-3), then we include them together in the regressions (column 4). Their signs and statistical significance show the inverted-U shaped relationship between ODA grants and growth, but a U-shaped relationship between ODA loans and growth. Past studies attribute the finding of diminishing marginal impact of aid to absorptive capacity constraints, Dutch disease and institutional weaknesses in developing countries.
Our findings reveal that this relationship stems from the grant component of aid only, while the loans component, in fact, has an increasing marginal impact on growth. The regressions results of the first-differenced regression are also qualitatively and quantitatively the similar (columns 5-8).
[ Table 4 near here]
In a footnote to (grants) is more effective at its low level, its marginal effect decreases at increasing rate at the higher level of such transfer. In part, this finding appears to appeal to the morals of giving aid as underscored by Stern (1974) , who argues for the transfer from the rich to the poor if the benefit to the latter justifies the cost to the former.
In column (3), we evaluate and report the marginal effect of ODA loans and offshore bank ODA loans, and ODA grants vs. offshore bank loans, below (above) which the marginal effect of ODA grants (loans) may be larger. First, we compute the value of X by equating the marginal effect of ODA grants with the marginal effect of ODA loans, i.e., β 1 + 2×β 2 ×X = β 3 + 2×β 4 ×X.
Similarly, we compute the value of Y by equating the marginal effect of ODA grants with the marginal effect of offshore bank loans, i.e., β 1 + 2×β 2 ×Y = β 5 + 2×β 6 ×Y. For these calculations, we use the coefficients in the fully specified model in column 4 of table 2. These values of X and Y are 3.048 and 3.48, respectively, which are higher than the mean value of log ODA grant/GDP and lower than the mean values of both log ODA loans/GDP and of log offshore bank loans/GDP.
Our results that we derive using the first-differenced regressions and calculations of the marginal effects and of the critical values are qualitatively the same (columns 5-8).
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the estimated effect of log ODA grants/GDP, log ODA loans/GDP and log offshore loans/GDP on fitted values of log growth rate of real income per capita, respectively. Over most of the range of log ODA grants/GDP, lower levels of grants are associated with higher level of economic growth. This effect, however, diminishes with higher levels of grants, suggesting its inverted U-shaped relationship with growth. On other hand, lower levels of both ODA loans and offshore bank loans cause downward pressure on economic growth, while after reaching a certain threshold level their positive effect dominates their negative effect suggesting their inverted U-shaped relationship with growth.
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 near here]
We now briefly discuss the results of control variables. Our results strongly support the past findings that domestic investment, trade openness and institutional quality (as proxied by voice and accountability) positively affect growth, while government consumption and inflation have negative influence on growth. The sign of log initial GDP per capita is negative in all the FGLS regressions, while its sign is positive in all the first-differenced regressions; however, none of its coefficient are found to be statistically significant.
Many past studies state that employing different control variables can change the results in growth regression (see, for example, Dollar and Levin, 2004) . Thus, we check whether the results of our variables of interest are robust to the introduction of alternative institutional quality indicators that may explain growth. In Table 5 , we replace voice and accountability with political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, one at a time.
These results show that the sign, significance and even the magnitude of the coefficients of the main variables remain the same with the inclusion of different institutional variables. All these results support the past assertion that institutions are important for growth. Similar exercise for the firstdifferenced regressions provides the same results. To conserve space, those results are not reported here.
[ Table 5 near here]
Analysis at different income levels
In this section, we check whether our results are qualitatively the same when we apply our analysis to countries which are at the different levels of income. Thus, we divide our sample into four category: Table 6 , columns (1-4) reports results for the FGLS, while columns (5-8) presents results for the DGMM regressions. These results strongly reinforce our above findings, except that the coefficients of log ODA grants/GDP and its squared terms are not statistically significant in columns 5 and 6. We also calculate and report the marginal effects and critical values of ODA grants, ODA loans and offshore bank loans in Table 6 . These values draw the similar conclusion as in Tables 4 and 5 . Note that the coefficient of log initial GDP per capita, which was statistically insignificant in Tables 4 and 5 , is negative and significant in 7 out of 8 regressions in Table 6 . In all the DGMM regressions, p-values of Sargan and autocorrelation tests confirm the validity of instruments and the absence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals, respectively.
[ Table 6 near here]
We also check the robustness of our results by excluding Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Transition economies from our regressions. OPEC economies generate high foreign reserves from sale of oil and petroleum products in the international market.
Therefore, their dependence on foreign aid for financing development projects is minimal. In fact, allocation of foreign aid to these economies has been quite low in our sample period, and most of the aid flows to them has been mainly comprised of humanitarian assistance and of ODA loans. On the other hand, starting in the early 1990s, Transition economies received substantially larger amounts of aid to support their transition to the free market system and new political regimes. Our main findings remain intact with the exclusion of these economies.
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Concluding Remarks
Should foreign aid be replaced by concessional loans or an easier access to international credit markets? One way to approach this question is to see which policy is more effective in spurring growth in developing nations. Accordingly, we pursue an empirical strategy of uncovering the relationship between growth, aid and loans for a cross-section of developing nations. We find that the growth-grant relationship is an inverted-U one, suggesting strong diminishing returns. This tends to reduce the desirability of grants at high levels. On the other hand, we find that the relationship between loans and growth is U-shaped, suggesting increasing returns, and hence an argument to expand loans from initial levels that are beyond a critical level.
We should note that offshore bank loans are a market determined variable, and so whether they should be substituted by (or substituted for) aid is not a directly relevant policy question.
However, reforms in the financial market can induce more inflow of private foreign capital and thus policies can indirectly affect private international credits. Moreover, aid itself has a loan and a grant component. Our study shows that the loan component of aid exhibits increasing returns, while the grant component has the traditional concave relationship with growth. Thus, it is very important to separate out the two components of foreign aid in examining the aid-growth relationship.
Accordingly, we can suggest two things: (i) if loans are used by aid agencies, they should be used in large quantities to avail of increasing returns; (ii) facing binding resource constraints, the aid agencies have to determine precisely where a particular developing nation is on their grant-growth or loans-growth curves to have a definitive answer on whether aid or loans may be a better tool at the margin. Finally, our findings suggest that where financial markets are not well-developed, availing of increasing returns will require major policy reforms to ease international capital flows, such that tangible growth benefits may be realized. Notes: The data span over the period 1996-2010. ODA stands for official development assistance. In this study, we use data of net disbursement of ODA. All of the ratios are denoted as percentage of GDP. Offshore bank loan data from Bank for International Settlement (BIS) is adjusted for exchange rate movements (done by BIS). Notes: The first-differencing of the data eliminate the country-specific fixed effects. Other notes are same as of Table 2 . 
